Economics for a Fairer Society by Tim Gooding

Author:Tim Gooding
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783030170202
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

3.The same as group 2 except the two end agents were members of both their own trading group and that of the neighbouring group (creating two links).

4.The same as group 3 except some groups had a single additional link to another random distant group.

For the purpose of this work, we note that the ‘small world network’ not only created the best outcome, but it did it with the fewest searches. In other words, it was computationally the least intensive while being the most efficient. It is also interesting that while it was computationally efficient, this system averaged the most trades of all the networks. The trade system with ‘perfect information’, where all agents can see and trade with all other agents, was considerably less efficient in terms of ultimate utility while being the most computationally intensive.

The final example is a fascinating result that appeared in a prisoner’s dilemma scenario that was set up using agents with considerable computational resources, including ‘a simple language to think with and enough resources to have memories and to act on them’ (Dedeo, 2017, paragraph 6). The two experimenters, Dedeo and Miller, were expecting a Tit-for-Tat strategy to become dominant as had happened in so many other prisoner dilemma experiments, but this was not the case. The eventual dominating agents were characterised as having ‘a taste for genocide’ (Dedeo, 2017, paragraph 1).

In their experiments, once a dominant culture was established, there was a relative period of peace. The agents dominating the peaceful society had evolved to look for sequences of behaviour that indicated whether other agents were ‘one of them’.Any deviation from the expected sequence was rewarded with total and permanent war. Such a response might take both machines down, in a kind of a digital suicide attack. Because the sequence was so hard to hit upon by accident, only the descendants of ruling machines could profit from the post-code era of selfless cooperation. All others were killed off, including those using the tit-for-tat strategy. This domination would last until enough errors accumulated in the code handed down between generations for dominant machines to stop recognizing each other. Then, they would turn against each other as viciously as they once turned against outsiders, in a kind of population-level autoimmune disease. (Dedeo, 2017, paragraph 11)

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